UPDATE: KGO’s Lilian Kim Responds Regarding the SFO “Near-Hit…”

Well, I’ve heard back from Ms. Lilian Kim at KGO. By way of reminder: this has to do with a story that KGO in San Francisco published about a near hit this past Saturday (26 May 2007), as well as KGO’s reporting and the FAA’s response to being questioned about the incident. I wrote an article Monday (28 May 2007) about it.

Ms. Kim was kind. Probably too kind, given my comments on her story. Here’s what she had to say:

Dear David,

Thank you for alerting us to the errors.  The broadcast correctly stated that Ian Gregor was an FAA spokesperson, but when it got transferred to our website, the title was mistakenly changed to FAA controller.  We apologize and will make the correction.  As for Emrear being spelled Embraer, that was my typo, and I apologize for that as well.

Thank you!

Lilian

Even the subject line of her email was too nice: “Thank You,” it said. Geez. Don’t I feel like an ass…

Anyway, I responded to Ms. Kim, and, because I’m longwinded, I took the opportunity to go on for a moment about what I thought might be problematic here. As always, I look forward to the comments of you, the reader, to help me understand whether or not I’ve gone astray…

You should also know that the KGO online article has been edited to show Mr. Gregor as an FAA spokesman, not a controller, and the aircraft manufacturer’s name is now spelled correctly.

 Oh, and before I forget, I’ve had a couple of requests for KSFO’s airport diagram. Here you go!

Anyway, here’s my response (only slightly edited):

---

Lilian,

What a nice email, especially given the fact that I wasn’t very kind in my blog! However, you’ll want to look at your message (below) again… the proper spelling is Embraer. Your phrasing (“As for Emrear being spelled Embraer…”) makes me worry just a little bit…

I’ll publish a nice update in the blog largely exonerating you . In the mean time, you really might want to give some thought to why an FAA spokesman would fry this controller before an investigation even begins. To quote:

“This appears to be one of the most serious runway events in San Francisco. The controller should not have cleared an aircraft to land and an aircraft to depart on the same time on those intersecting runways.”

As you probably know, ATC is all about communicating with precision—probably the big reason that controllers hate it when the news media mess up the facts and/or the interpretation of those facts. Given this, we’d be quicker to excuse the spokesman’s first sentence much more quickly than we would his second. Here’s why:

On of the words controllers (even us retired ones–what a hard habit to break!) use very carefully is the word “appear.” If a pilot says “Can you check and tell me whether my landing gear is down and locked?” the controller will always use the word “appear” in his or her answer: “Your gear appears to be down,” or “Your gear appears to be up.” That’s because we have no way of knowing what the status of the gear actually is. All we can do is report on what we see. Hence the mandated use of the term “appear.” That’s why Mr. Gregor can get away with calling this one of the most serious runway events in San Francisco. Not that he’s right. Just that he used a word that we recognize as softening his position. Perhaps that’s something we shouldn’t let go so easily, especially in cases like this, but use of that word hits us where we live.

As for his second sentence, he doesn’t get off so lightly. Clearances to land and take off on intersecting runways can be issued at the same time (and this is something that Mr. Wilson, KGO’s aviation consultant, needs to have in his quiver for times like this as well):

Both of these excerpts are from FAA Order 7110.65R, Air Traffic Control (the air traffic control “bible” in the US) (the bold is mine):

3−9−8. INTERSECTING RUNWAY SEPARATION
Separate departing aircraft from an aircraft using an
intersecting runway, or nonintersecting runways
when the flight paths intersect, by ensuring that the
departure does not begin takeoff roll until one of the
following exists:

a. The preceding aircraft has departed and passed
the intersection, has crossed the departure runway, or
is turning to avert any conflict.

b. A preceding arriving aircraft is clear of the
landing runway, completed the landing roll and will
hold short of the intersection, passed the intersection,
or has crossed over the departure runway.

3−9−5. ANTICIPATING SEPARATION
Takeoff clearance needs not be withheld until
prescribed separation exists if there is a reasonable
assurance it will exist when the aircraft starts takeoff
roll.

So, Mr. Gregor has made a broad statement which obscures rather than illuminates. Controllers clear aircraft to land and depart on intersecting runways all the time, and do it legally and safely. This is to say, the truth might be in there, but he hasn’t gone to a lot of trouble to show us where it is. In any case, he should not have made damning statements in advance of an investigation. And, as I mentioned above, you should be asking yourself why he did so. It may be related to the current anti-controller crusade in the FAA, or he may simply be incompetent. Me, I can’t say which is the case. However, he was out of his depth and had no business making these sorts of statements on behalf of the FAA before investigations were complete.

And to reiterate one more point, in light of the regulations governing simultaneous arrivals and departures on intersecting runways, your Mr. Wilson needs to be careful about his statements as well. I have no doubt that his mistake was simply a matter of not being properly informed, but the fact is, when he says:

“The rule is that this aircraft that is landing, has to be through this intersection at these two runways, before this departing airplane even gets clearance to start rolling for it to takeoff. Apparently that was not the case.”

…he is incorrect. That’s not “the rule.” A takeoff clearance may be issued to the departing aircraft if, in the controllers estimation, appropriate separation will be in place when the departure begins its takeoff roll. Anticipated separation is one of the reasons controllers deserve the big money. Any monkey (hell, a machine) can clear one aircraft for departure after the arrival has cleared the intersection, but it takes judgment and experience to be able to anticipate that sort of separation hundreds of times per day. That’s what air traffic controllers do all over the world, and you’re very lucky to have some of the best at SFO.

Mr. Wilson is quoted two more times:

ABC7 aviation consultant Ron Wilson says the unique layout of SFO makes air traffic control work tedious. As the intersecting runways can often create a confusing situation.

Ron Wilson, ABC7 Aviation Consultant: “All the airplanes are not landing and taking off in the same direction so the looking at the same place all the time. At SFO you have to look at different places.”

First, I’d point out that ATC at SFO is anything but tedious. I’d suggest you schedule a visit to the tower to see what I mean. These men and women earn their pay every single day. Weather, the proximity of SQL, OAK, and SJC, noise abatement, helicopter and fixed-wing transitions, and hell, being the major airport at one of the world’s most popular destinations, mean lots of complex traffic. These folks are not bored.

Second, controllers never look at the same place all of the time. They are constantly scanning and keeping that information alive in their minds. That’s the nature of the job. If the implication is that the controller here was looking at a departure and forgot an arrival, or vice versa, I’d say that that implication is probably incorrect. I’ll wait for the report myself, but I’d guess that something else was afoot.

Bottom line, remember that you’re very lucky to have the kind of talent in the tower at SFO that you’ve got there. Again, I encourage you to spend an hour in the tower cab, plugged-in with the local controller, watching the operation and asking questions. I’d also suggest that you ask the Facility Manager whether one of the controllers at SFO might sit down with you for an in-depth interview about what they do there and how they do it. Personally, I was the subject of one of those interviews myself more than 20 years ago (as a controller at another location) and it came off very well. No sensationalism, just a better understanding for the community.

Finally, know that, if this controller screwed-up, he or she screwed-up. Period. Other controllers accept that. What we don’t accept is the FAA making conclusary statements the day after an incident. That is the height unfair treatment.

Thanks again for the nice email.

Dave

---

So, dear reader, do I need to reel it in or am I on the right track? Your input is, as always, appreciated.

–Dave

San Francisco’s KGO has Problems with the Facts

One Lilian Kim of KGO in San Francisco filed this copyrighted story 28 minutes ago…

Planes Come Within 300 Feet
By Lilian Kim

May 27 – KGO – There was a near miss at SFO, two commuter jets came within 300-feet of each other. The incident happened as one plane was landing while another was taking off. Officials are considering it a serious incursion.

SFO has around three close calls every year. But the near collision Saturday was much closer than what they’ve seen before.

There are roughly 360,000 flights at SFO every year, but on Saturday, two planes got too close for comfort. Two passenger planes came within 300 feet of each other. It happened as one plane had just landed, the other had just taken off. According to the FAA, the departing plane over flew the other aircraft by only 300 feet.

Ian Gregor, FAA Controller: “This appears to be one of the most serious runway events in San Francisco. The controller should not have cleared an aircraft to land and an aircraft to depart on the same time on those intersecting runways.”

The planes involved were small commuter planes, an Emrear 120 and an Emrear 170, one operated by Provence Aero Service the other by SkyWest. The FAA is investigating the near-collision. They say fatigue wasn’t an issue because the air traffic controller had just started his shift. They also say it was not a staffing issue because the tower was fully staffed at the time. They believe the air traffic controller just made an honest mistake.

Ron Wilson, ABC7 Aviation Consultant: “The rule is that this aircraft that is landing, has to be through this intersection at these two runways, before this departing airplane even gets clearance to start rolling for it to takeoff. Apparently that was not the case.”

ABC7 aviation consultant Ron Wilson says the unique layout of SFO makes air traffic control work tedious. As the intersecting runways can often create a confusing situation.

Ron Wilson, ABC7 Aviation Consultant: “All the airplanes are not landing and taking off in the same direction so the looking at the same place all the time. At SFO you have to look at different places.”

No word on how long the FAA needs to investigate this case. They say it’s too soon to say if the air traffic controller will face any disciplinary action.

Copyright 2007, ABC7/KGO-TV/DT.

You know me, Mr. “What the Heck is the Press Thinking?”

Like I said, this came out 28 minutes ago so hell, I don’t have any more info than you. Except for one little tidbit…

Recall Ms Kim saying, “…Ian Gregor, FAA Controller: “This appears to be one of the most serious runway events in San Francisco. The controller should not have cleared an aircraft to land and an aircraft to depart on the same time on those intersecting runways…” Well, my first thought was, “according to the story this just happened yesterday. Who the heck is this controller coming up with this definitive statement about what should or shouldn’t have happened?” Turns out I was right to ask.

Ian Gregor is NOT a controller. He’s the FAA’s Western-Pacific Region Public Affairs guy. Take a look at the FAA website here: http://www.faa.gov/news/contact_information/. Why did Ms. Kim decide to say he was a controller? One can only assume that there’s more mileage in stories about we controllers eating our own.

Now that’s just not fair. While the rest of us wait to learn what really happened here, KGO and the FAA apparently have already made up their minds. Shame on them.

Oh hell, I lied. It’s actually two tidbits (or three, depending upon how you count): Ms. Kim insists that the aircraft involved were an Emrear 120 and an Emrear 170. If she’d bothered to check her facts I’ll bet she’d have found that they’re really Embraer airframes, not Emear. Of course, facts aren’t really that important anyway, are they?

I’ve forwarded this column to KGO. I’ll let you know what the outcome is.

Like I said, shame.
–Dave

Honolulu Near Hit

 You know me. I simply don’t understand why the press has such difficulty with the facts when it comes to aviation. Granted, the press may well have difficulty with the facts in every human undertaking, but my expertise is in aviation, hence this lashing-out…

First let’s dispense with the news: Thom Gurule, a controller at Honolulu Tower (PHNL) saved the day last Thursday when a C130 (allegedly based in Japan) and a CRJ tried to come together on his airport and he simply wasn’t having it. According to Aero-News.Net (in a copyrighted story), it went down like this…

The C-130 had just landed on Runway 4 Right, according to air traffic controller Scott Sorenson, and nosed toward the path of a go! CRJ-200 taking off on Runway 8 Left. FAA regional spokesman Ian Gregor said the C-130 crossed the “hold bars” and was only 110 feet from the runway edge “but didn’t intrude onto the runway itself.” Gurule instructed the C-130 pilot — twice — to “exit at Taxiway Echo, turn left, cross Runway 4 Left, then turn left on Taxiway Bravo, which runs parallel to Taxiway 8 Left,” [See our diagram] Gregor said. “But the C-130 pilot didn’t make the left turn on Taxiway B. He kept going straight on, heading straight toward Runway 8, where the regional jet was on its take-off.” Gurule looked up and saw the C-130 had not turned onto Taxiway B as instructed, but was now on the roll directly in the path of the oncoming go! Jet — which he had just given permission to take off. The C-130 pilot “was definitely in a very dangerous place to be,” said Gurule as the go! pilot was rapidly approaching “past the point of no return.” Gurule said he just yelled at the C-130 pilot to “hold your position”… and this time he did as instructed.

Here’s the referred-to diagram (the blue lines show what the C130 was instructed to do, the red lines show what the C130 did, and the green line shows the route of the departing CRJ. Oh yeah, the purple dot is the control tower):

To continue with the http://www.aero-news.net copyrighted story, “…after the go! Jet took off directly in front of the C-130; Gurule said “There was a slight moment of silence. I asked Air Shuttle 1018, ‘Are you OK?’ You could tell the pilot was absolutely shaken up. His response was, ‘It was a little crazy for a second but we’re OK.’ Then he was concerned that maybe he did something wrong. His question to me was, ‘I was cleared for take-off, wasn’t I?’”

Yup. You were, indeed, cleared for takeoff my friend.

According to the story, one Lt. Melanie McLean, a Hickam AFB spokesperson (Note: Hickam shares the airport with Honolulu International) noted that…“it was minor in nature. …the aircraft and the pilots were in no danger.” Me, I’ve got to wonder what Lt. McLean does consider dangerous…

Oh yeah! The rant part!

OK. It’s a minor thing, but still, I’d expect more. Here’s what KITV, “The Hawaii Channel (thehawaiichannel.com) reported:

Quick thinking by an air traffic controller prevented a disaster at Honolulu International Airport over the weekend when a military jet accidentally taxied into the path of a passenger jet that was taking off, officials said.

It wasn’t a military jet, and it didn’t taxi into the path of a passenger jet. Just that simple. A C130 is a turboprop. Yup, there’s a jet in there, but the aircraft isn’t a jet in anybody’s estimation. What’s more, the article uses the term “air controllers, “ which is anathema to those of us in the biz. We don’t control air. We control air traffic.

Now explain something about which I know nothing.

Good job Thom. I’m proud to be part of your fraternity.

–Dave

Ueberlingen Trial Continues

Pity the late Peter Nielsen. Being dead and all, he’s not available to defend himself, and so everybody from the press to his old employers at Skyguide have taken advantage of that fact to demonize him.

You’ll recall that Nielsen was the lone Skyguide air traffic controller on position when the Lake Constance/Ueberlingen/Bodensee midair took place on 1 July 2002, and he was brutally murdered outside his Zurich home by Vitali Kaloyev on 24 February 2004. Kaloyev, Nielsen’s killer, lost his wife, son, and daughter in the midair.

Here’s an example in a copyrighted Associated Press story from the International Herald Tribune, published 22 May 2007:

The controller gave the two aircraft only 44 seconds’ warning that they were getting too close to each other. He also mistakenly told the Russian plane to descend — sending the jetliner straight into the cargo jet.

Let’s dispense with the easy stuff first: at this point the Swiss court hasn’t blamed anyone. Therefore, the only official findings on this accident are in the Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung report which lists these, and only these Causes:

The following immediate causes have been identified:

• The imminent separation infringement was not noticed by ATC in time. The instruction for the TU154M to descend was given at a time when the prescribed separation to the B757-200 could not be ensured anymore.
• The TU154M crew followed the ATC instruction to descend and continued to do so even  after TCAS advised them to climb. This manoeuvre was performed contrary to the generated TCAS RA.

The following systemic causes have been identified:

• The integration of ACAS/TCAS II into the system aviation was insufficient and did not correspond in all points with the system philosophy. The regulations concerning ACAS/TCAS published by ICAO and as a result the regulations of national aviation authorities, operational and procedural instructions of the TCAS manufacturer and the operators were not standardised, incomplete and partially contradictory.
• Management and quality assurance of the air navigation service company did not ensure that during the night all open workstations were continuously staffed by controllers.
• Management and quality assurance of the air navigation service company tolerated for years that during times of low traffic flow at night only one controller worked and the other one retired to rest.

So, back to what the Associated Press story seems to be implying are the causes of the accident:

1. The controller gave the two aircraft only 44 seconds’ warning that they were getting too close to each other.

Yeah. Ok. The report says that Nielsen noticed the conflict too late and thus, his resolution came too late. But,

2. He also mistakenly told the Russian plane to descend — sending the jetliner straight into the cargo jet.

Oh please.

The article is implying that, because the Russian crew was getting a TCAS climb RA from its onboard equipment, an instruction from the controller to descend was a mistake on that controller’s part. This idea is utter nonsense. Here’s why.

TCAS-equipped aircraft coordinate between themselves to negotiate a solution to a potential collision and Nielsen had no way of knowing that this was happening. He saw targets merging and made an effort to separate them. Again, he had no way of knowing that the TCAS computers aboard the two aircraft had already come up with their own solution and that at least one of the aircraft was complying with TCAS RA commands. That’s why pilots and controllers have come to an agreement on how this sort of thing needs to be handled. In short, when a TCAS RA orders a pilot to take a particular action and the controller orders a different action, the pilot must always follow the TCAS. The reason for this is simple: as I noted above, the controller has no way to know that the pilots are following at TCAS RA until one or both of the pilots mention it. Of course, technological advances are beginning to make that information available to controllers, but that night in July 2002, Nielson had no way to know that a TCAS RA had been generated or whether either crew were following that RA.

Germany’s Aeronautical Information Publication (ENR 1.8.22 in this case) addresses TCAS RAs and Paragraph 2.2.2, Resolution Advisories, says,

a) All Resolution Advisories (corrective or preventive) should be followed unless the pilot can visually identify the conflicting traffic and decide that no deviation from the current flight path is needed. When subsequently the Resolution Advisory changes the pilot should again respond promptly in compliance with the indications. Failure to comply with a Resolution Advisory can result in a less desire vertical miss distance at the closest point of approach.
c) If a decision is made not to follow a Resolution advisory (corrective or preventive) a manoeuvre should never be made in a direction opposite to the one indicated by the Resolution Advisory. This is particularly important as the system may coordinate, unknown to the pilot, with another equipped aircraft.
d) Recovery manoeuvres to resume to assigned ATC clearance should be initiated immediately after the system announces “clear of conflict.”

Recall that the AP story says that Nielsen “…mistakenly told the Russian plane to descend — sending the jetliner straight into the cargo jet.” This is nonsensical. Sure, Nielsen was late, but his control instruction was exactly right. Not knowing (and not being expected to know) of the TCAS RA transpiring between these two aircraft, he picked one aircraft and issued a control instruction. While I don’t know why he selected the TU instead of the Boeing, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to start the TU down in that he was scheduled to be descended anyway. Moreover, when we make these sorts of instantaneous decisions, all other things being equal (for instance, targets have already merged), descending the aircraft who was planning for lower in the first place might just be the most expeditious thing to do.

Nope. Nielsen didn’t make a mistake. Given the proximity of the targets he used all the info he had to sort it out. The mistake came when the TU crew followed Nielsen’s control instruction rather than the TCAS RA. Read that German AIP excerpt above again. If you’re not going to follow the TCAS RA, whatever you do, don’t do something opposite to the TCAS RA. Again, pilots and controllers have come to a formal agreement on this point: If I (as a controller) give you a control instruction that conflicts with a TCAS RA, you are to follow the TCAS RA every time. If I don’t know you’re following the TCAS RA I may keep jabbering, giving you control instructions, but just ignore me. Follow the RA.

So where does the AP get the idea that Nielsen made a mistake? Doesn’t that word mean something completely different? Is it just Nielsen-bashing?

Given all of this, the paucity of information coming out of the Skyguide trial is especially irritating. Here’s part of a copyrighted report from the Russian RIA Novosti  dated 22 May 2007:

At Tuesday’s court hearing, [Zurich Prosecutor Bernhard] Hecht also dismissed suggestions that errors by the Russian crew could have been a factor in the crash.

An independent Austrian expert who gave evidence to the Buelach court earlier this week also said the Tu-154 pilots had been correct to follow the human controller’s instructions rather than those given by the on-board Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).

Say again? That’s nuts.

But among all of the trial reports the real kicker (and the reason for this rant in the first place) can be found in the same RIA Novosti article:

The eight Skyguide personnel who are on trial in the case denied any personal involvement, saying Nielsen, slain in 2004 by a Russian who lost his family in the accident, was the only one to blame.

Yeah. That was easy. Stay tuned.

-Dave

Southern California TRACON Goes Mapless

In a copyrighted story today, the North County Times (north San Diego County, California) reported that Lindbergh Field (KSAN) traffic was returning to normal after a “radar control outage.” Here’s the story as printed…

Lindbergh Field air traffic returning to normal

By: North County Times

SAN DIEGO —- A radar control outage early today affecting Southern California airports wasn’t having a major effect on air traffic at Lindbergh Field in San Diego, an air operations support employee said.

Heidi Connell said the problem between 4:45 and 6:30 a.m. might have been caused by an equipment upgrade at a facility that is responsible for air traffic control at Lindbergh and about 20 other airports, including the Los Angeles International Airport.

“But there are no departures from San Diego until 6:30,” she said.

However, the radar glitch did affect incoming flights during that time and that was causing some delays, said Connell.

“There were slight delays in the beginning, but in a few hours it should be just about normal,” she said. “It was a ground stop and nothing was flying.”

Anyone meeting planes or flying out should check with the airlines to be sure planes are arriving and leaving on time, she said.

The radar interruption came at the start of the three-day Memorial Day weekend, when air travel is very busy.

Of course, as it turns out it wasn’t a radar outage, and the problems at Lindbergh weren’t the epicenter of the problem. The actual problem was automation-related and affected all southern California airspace (to be fair, a point mentioned by the author).

At 1250Z on 25 May 2007 the FAA’s ARTCC issued a ground stop for Southern California TRACON airspace, declaring ATC Zero for SCT because no maps were available at any control position. All IFR traffic in, out, and through SCT airspace was stopped until such time as ZLA (LA Center) could pick up the airspace. However, by around 1335Z SCT was back in business and the ground stop was lifted. Throughout, the TRACON’s radar (secondary and primary) continued to work and air to ground communication was not affected. But no maps=no vectors…

And just like that we have an example of one of the problems with consolidated TRACONs: a facility-wide equipment outage is automatically a regional outage—something that the author of the North County Times article should gotten really excited about. For there was a time when an outage at one Southern California approach control would have impacted only a handful of airports (albeit large, busy airports), but today, the inability to bring up a map on a single ACD (ARTS Color Display) in this consolidated facility meant that commercial aviation in an entire region ground to a halt. That’s clearly problematic.

As a reminder, SCT is an FAA consolidated TRACON which combined the former Los Angeles, Burbank, Ontario, Coast (Orange County), and San Diego TRACONs into a single facility at Miramar MCAS in San Diego County. SCT is the busiest approach control in the world with over 2.2 million operations annually and its airspace covers over 17,000 square miles. ZLA airspace overlies SCT airspace in every sector.

In contrast, a pre-1995 automation failure at, say, Coast Approach, would have shut down only Coast Approach. Aircraft destined for Orange County (KSNA) could have been diverted to Los Angeles (KLAX) or San Diego (KSAN) or Ontario (KONT) and worked into those airports by their respective TRACONs. If the failure at Coast was expected to continue for some time, the Coast airspace could have been delegated to ZLA and the Center could have worked approaches into KSNA. Given the fact that ZLA is already understaffed and the controllers there are not particularly accustomed to working KSNA approaches, turning-over the airspace to the Center is not an optimal solution, but it is a reasonable, safe, and workable one, even though the arrival rate would be held very low.

Fast-forward to today. With a consolidated TRACON, a facility-wide outage takes down all of the airports in the region. And if you believe for one second that ZLA has the manpower to cover those airports, you’re deluding yourself. ZLA is supposed to be staffed to cover its own day-to-day operations, and even then it’s short-handed. To think that, in addition to its own traffic, it could suddenly work all of the traffic normally handled by the busiest approach control in the world is just nuts. If it could, you’d have to ask what those additional controllers are doing all day long up in Palmdale, and why we need to have a Southern California TRACON at all.

Today the SCT came back on line because they were able to heal the automation problem. But what if it’s not that easy? In 2003 SCT was evacuated because wild fires threatened the building and the effect was the same: IFR traffic in the region was suddenly ground stopped. One can easily imagine any number of nastier things which might threaten a building and result in much lengthier outages…

At this moment the FAA is working to bring the Palm Springs TRACON (KPSP) into the SCT fold, and it’s meeting resistance on a number of levels. That resistance got a shot in the arm this morning when SCT shut down but PSP stayed in business.

Look, I remain of two minds on the consolidated TRACON issue, and this rant shouldn’t be read as my having abdicated my position on the fence. It’s just that it’s hard to ignore the downside when it slaps you in the face.

Look for more on this topic in upcoming columns. Your comments are most welcome.

-Dave

Controllers in Israel not on Strike. Yet…

Israeli controllers voted today [20 May 2007] to go forward in a pre-strike labor action. Not that they’re going to shut-down all operations right away… for now, they’ll be satisfied with not working “extra-schedule” flights. In other words, if you’re not scheduled, you’re not flying. We’re told that the labor action stems from “unilateral moves by management to change the government department’s structure.” We’ll have to look a little closer to determine what that means…

-Dave

Lake Constance Goes to Trial

Yesterday, ITAR-TASS ran the following…

2002 air crash compensations to be set after Skyguide staff trial.
07.05.2007, 19.01
 
 GENEVA, May 7 (Itar-Tass) — The question of compensation payments to the 120 relatives of July 2002 air disaster over Germany’s Lake Boden will be decided after the trial of eight staff of Switzerland’s Skyguide air traffic control company, thought to be responsible for the incident.

The decision was made by Switzerland’s Federal Administrative Tribunal earlier on Monday.

A Russian Tupolev-154 passenger jet of the Bashkirian Airlines collided with a Boeing-747 cargo jet of the DHL delivery company on the night from July 1 to 2, 2002. Seventy-one passengers, including 49 children on the way to a holiday resort in Spain died.

Investigation has found out that the blame for the disaster must be placed on Skyguide air traffic controllers and technical personnel, who failed to take the proper measures to ensure safety within the area of the company’s responsibility.

Eight Skyguide staff will be put on trial in Beulah on May 15. The prosecution believes they were responsible for professional negligence, which resulted in the heavy loss of human life, and demands prison sentences ranging 15 to six months.

The trial is expected to last two weeks.

Skyguide in December 2006 acknowledged its responsibility for the disaster and volunteered to pay compensations to the victims’ relatives. No details were disclosed, though.

Last January 120 relatives of the air crash victims filed formal lawsuits with Switzerland’s Federal Administrative Tribunal demanding compensations.

At their request the procedure of considering the lawsuits and the making of decisions as to the form and size of compensations were postponed until the trial of Skyguide personnel has ended. 
  

Factually wrong? You bet. Indeed, wrong on so many levels….  More to come on a later post. In the mean time, fans of the truth need to make their voices heard.

–Dave

Peter Nielsen, the SkyGuide air traffic controller on duty during the midair, was murdered in front of his home in this buliding by a relative of some of the accident victims.